July 8, 1998 Boating Accident on the Mississippi River To: " WRD Archive File, " Cc: "Melvin Lew, Hydrologist, Reston, VA ", "Carole Nethaway, Secretary (OA), Reston, VA ", "Alice C Dilandro, Secretary (S), Reston, VA " Subject: July 8, 1998 Boating Accident on the Mississippi River Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1998 08:58:43 -0400 From: "Alice C Dilandro, Secretary (S), Reston, VA " To: "A - Division Chief and Staff", "DC - All District Chiefs", "CD - All Data Chiefs", "G. Richard Marzolf, Chief, BRR, ER, Reston, VA" , "John B Weeks, Chief, Branch of Reg. Research, Denver, CO" , "Steven E Ingebritsen, Chief, Br. of Regional Resrch, Menlo Park, CA" From: "Catherine L Hill, ACH/Operations, Reston, VA" Cc: " WRD Safety, Reston, VA" , "Catherine L Hill, ACH/Operations, Reston, VA" , "Stephen F Blanchard, Deputy ACHO, Reston, VA" , "William G Shope Jr., Chief, Br. of Oper. Support, Reston, VA" , "Melvin Lew, Hydrologist, Reston, VA" , "Alice C Dilandro, Secretary (S), Reston, VA" Subject: July 8, 1998 Boating Accident on the Mississippi River Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1998 09:20:56 -0400 Sender: "Alice C Dilandro, Secretary (S), Reston, VA" In Reply Refer To: Mail Stop 405 MEMORANDUM July 29, 1998 To: District Chiefs Chief, Branch of Regional Research- ER, CR, WR Chief, Hydrologic Instrumentation Facility From: Catherine L. Hill Assistant Chief Hydrologist for Operations Subject: Lessons to be Learned from a Recent Boating Accident on the Mississippi River This memorandum is transmitted for your information on a recent SERIOUS BOATING ACCIDENT THAT COULD HAVE LED TO LIVES LOST and to provide recommendations to reduce risk to employees. The accident occurred Wednesday, July 8, 1998 on the Mississippi River near Thebes, IL. Three hydrologic technicians, were onboard a 17-foot Monark, taking water-quality samples for NASQAN2. The river depth was about 50 feet, just below flood stage, and the surface velocity was about 7 ft/sec. As the technicians started their cross-section, the sampler got hung on an unknown submerged object, causing the boat to list to starboard. Attempts to stop the listing and cut the sampler line were unsuccessful. Within 10 to 15 seconds, the end of the sampler line was reached, the starboard stern of the boat was pulled underwater, one technician was thrown overboard, the other jumped, and the boat capsized trapping one technician in the cabin. He was able to feel his way to the forward door and escaped the almost completely submerged boat. The three Technicians drifted some 2 to 3 miles downstream before getting to shore, due to rip currents that tended to pull them back into mid-stream. The technicians were wearing their personal flotation devices. The Missouri District Chief's report, dated July 16, 1998, and the Bureau Watercraft Safety Program Manager's assessment report, dated July 15, 1998 are attached. These reports provide a detailed account of the incident, identify contributing factors to the accident, and present recommendations to reduce the risk to employees. . Water Resources Division (WRD) employees should take the time to review the accounts and evaluations of this incident. We strongly encourage you to take advantage of the lessons learned from this accident. Review your boating equipment, operational procedures, and Job Hazard Analysis. The Watercraft Safety Program Manager's assessment points out several recommendations that could have avoided the accident. We feel these recommendations have application to all WRD boating operations. We congratulate the technicians for having the boat training, wearing their PERSONAL FLOTATION DEVICES, and maintaining their senses during a very hazardous situation. ATTACHMENTS Subject: Mississippi River Boat Accident Date: Thu, 16 Jul 1998 10:58:04 -0500 From: Jim Barks Organization: USGS-WRD This is a brief summary of the boat accident that occurred on the Mississippi River at Thebes, Illinois, on July 8, 1998. I have attached independent accounts of the accident given by the three Hydrologic Technicians from the Missouri District who were on the boat--Bob Whitaker, Brett Giddens, and Craig French. Bob, Brett, and Craig were sampling at the NASQAN station, Mississippi River at Thebes, Illinois, as they had many times before. Their craft was a 17-foot Monark trihull aluminum boat powered by a 175-horsepower motor. The sampling rig was mounted near the stern on the starboard side because of inadequate workspace on the bow. The river was just below flood stage, the surface velocity was about 7 ft/s and the depth was about 50 feet. The weather was clear and calm and barge traffic was light. Brett lowered the sampler and attached 100-pound weight to the bottom where they became hung. The boat listed suddenly to the starboard. Any attempts to get free by throttling up and thumbing the trigger switch quickly (a technique that had worked before) failed and the stern of the boat took on a small amount of water. Bob instructed Brett to release the brake on the reel to put slack in the cable and asked Craig to cut the cable. The boat drifted downstream nearly perpendicular to the flow. Bob tried to power up and turn the boat upstream, but this caused the boat to list more and take on more water because the cable would not feed from the reel fast enough to allow slack in it. Craig attempted to cut the moving cable, but could not. When the end of the cable was reached the boat stopped abruptly, throwing Craig overboard. The stern was immediately swamped and only part of the bow remained above the water. The time elapsed since hanging up was only about 15 seconds. Brett was able to jump from the swamped boat, but Bob remained in the mostly submerged cabin. He had been hit in the head by a toolbox when the boat stopped abruptly. Bob found refuge temporarily in an air pocket in the bow of the boat, then moved underwater to the submerged cabin and escaped through the front cabin door. The boat sank and the three men started to swim toward shore. They were eventually separated by the strong current, but were reunited on shore. They had been in the water about 45 minutes and drifted downstream about 2 1/2 to 3 miles. After traversing rough terrain and crossing three small rivers the men returned to their vehicle about 3 1/2 hours after the accident. All three were exhausted, but none had sustained serious injuries. It is important to emphasize that all three personnel were experienced boat operators (they had sampled the Mississippi River many times using the same boat), were boat-operator certified (May 1997), were wearing their PFD's, and kept their heads. The primary factors that contributed to the accident probably were: * The sampling equipment became irretrievably hung. * The boat had inadequate freeboard. * The boat had inadequate positive floatation. * The boom of the sampling rig extended over the side of the boat near the stern. * The water velocity made the boat unmanageable under the circumstances. * There was no mechanism for cutting the moving cable. * The end of the cable was securely attached to the reel. Based on these probable contributing factors, other occurrences during the accident, and some afterthoughts, the following recommendations are made: 1. Make sure workboats have adequate freeboard. 2. Make sure workboats have adequate positive floatation. The boat we lost was an older boat that was surplused by the Corps of Engineers. Many such boats have no positive floatation. 3. Boat cabins should have easy, multiple escape routes. 4. Always operate sampling or measuring equipment from the bow of the boat. 5. A device that can quickly cut stationary and moving cable should be mounted to the rig. 6. Pullout fittings should be installed at the end of sounding-reel cables (Cathy Hill memo dated March 16, 1998). 7. There should always be at least one experienced, safety-trained person on each boat. 8. PFD's must be worn at all times while on the boat. 9. All heavy objects must be secured to the boat. 10. When operated in cold water, boats must have a life raft or smaller boat capable of safely holding the crew. 11. We should evaluate our boat needs in WRD, develop specifications to meet these needs, and identify manufactures who can meet our requirements (Suggested by Harry Hitchcock, Kentucky). 12. Boat-certification training should include boat operation and safety during flood conditions (suggested by Harry Hitchcock, Kentucky). Bob's Account On July 8, 1998, Brett Giddens, Craig French, and I were collecting sediment and water-quality samples at the NASQAN station, Mississippi River at Thebes, Illinois. We were sampling from a 17-foot Monark trihull aluminum boat with a 175-horse Evinrude motor. An E-reel mounted to a boom that extended over the starboard side was used to sample. The river stage was 32.70 feet which is just below flood stage. The weather was clear and sunny with an air temperature of 92 degrees and a water temperature of 84 degrees. There was no drift and barge traffic was light at the time we were sampling. We had finished collecting the sediment sample; Brett was operating the E-reel; Craig was handling the water sample; and I was operating the boat. After rating the sampler and obtaining a rinse sample, we were collecting our first water sample at the station closest to the right edge of the water. Brett lowered the sampler with a 100-pound weight (the velocity on the surface was 7 ft/sec and the depth was 40 feet). As soon as we hit bottom, he pressed the trigger switch and the boat began to list to the starboard side (the boom extends out over the starboard side). Having been in this situation several times, we were not alarmed. I moved the boat just slightly upstream and Brett pressed the trigger switch again. The boat again began to list; only this time, we began to take on a small amount of water, and the current pushed the boat at a 45-degree angle with the current. I immediately told Brett to release the brake to give us slack in the cable and instructed Craig to cut the cable. Because of the water velocity, the cable would not feed out fast enough to allow any slack and any attempt I made to motor upstream or turn the boat caused the boat to list taking on small amounts of water. Craig was unable to cut the moving cable and I could never get in a position to stop the cable long enough to give him the opportunity to cut it. When we reached the end of the cable, the boat lurched violently to the starboard side throwing Craig first on top of the motor and then off the port side. When the boat lurched, I instructed Brett to jump (Brett was thrown against the boom and suffered a scrape along his side, but was still able to jump out). I stood up to get out of the boat cabin, but was struck in the head by a toolbox and knocked to the floor. The boat sank instantly and I was trapped in the cabin. I made one attempt to kick the side window out, but couldn't do it. By now, there was only about 2-feet of the bow out of the water. I managed to pull myself up and get a breath of air. With God's help, I was able to pull myself out of the bow; find the front door of the cabin, and crawl out before the boat sank. The time period from the time we first became hung-up until I was trapped was approximately 10-15 seconds. It took about two seconds for all but the bow of the boat to sink. After I was out of the boat, all three of us started swimming towards the right shore; it took 45 minutes to reach the shore, and we were carried about two to three miles downstream. We then had to walk back to the trucks, crossing three smaller rivers and some very rough terrain, which took about 3 1/2 hours. I have been asked numerous times how this could have been avoided. First, if at all possible do not work off the side of a boat in fast velocities. Second, cut the cable the instant you are hung up (we are now working on a design to have a cuter mounted to the boom that will cut the cable instantly, even if cable is being let out of the reel). Third, have flotation in the boat, so that if it does take on water it won't sink instantly; and have as big a boat with as much freeboard as you can get. There are a thousand things that could have happened where one or all of us would not have made it. Having worked for the Survey for over 20 years, I know how you can get caught up in "it won't happen to me" or "we've done it this way forever and nothing ever happened." This is the same way I felt and if anything can be learned, it's that 10-15 seconds can change your mind. We should take an honest look at whatever we are doing and see if we can make what we do safer. We don't need to be Chicken Little, but we need to stop being lemmings or ostriches. Brett's Account The following is a report of the accident that occurred on the Mississippi River at Thebes, Illinois, the afternoon of Wednesday, July 8, 1998. Personnel on the boat were Bob Whitaker, Craig French, and myself. Bob was piloting the boat, Craig was in charge of splitting samples, while I ran the sampling rig, which was mounted near the stern on the starboard side. We had just completed sediment sampling, and had, after switching the P-61 sediment sampler for the Amazon bag sampler, uneventfully finished the rating phase of the QW sample. The river was at a stage of 33 feet and had a measured mean velocity of 6.5 ft/sec. with a total depth of 48-50 feet. The time was 1410. After collecting a rinse sample for the field rinsing of sample containers, Bob moved the boat to the first station of our cross section. I began to lower the sampler through the water to complete the first vertical at that station. Immediately upon touching the bottom, the sampler became irretrievably hung on an unknown submerged object. The boat listed violently to starboard. Bob immediately throttled up and I thumbed the trigger switch quickly twice trying to free the sampler. This procedure has worked many times in the past, but did not this time. At this point, Bob called for me to release the brake on the reel, which I did simultaneous with his instructions. The boat began to drift downstream with the current as cable continued to come off the reel. The boat traveled perpendicular to the flow of the river at this time. Bob tried several times to alleviate this condition by powering up and turning upstream, but each attempt only served to cause severe listing of the craft to starboard. At no time, was there any slack in the cable as it was released from the reel. Several attempts were made by Craig to cut the fast moving line, all to no avail. One last try was made as the cable neared the end of the reel, this with me applying the brake. The final attempt failed, the brake was released and remaining cable was unleashed. Twenty feet later, the end of the line was reached, the boat's forward momentum abruptly stopped, and the stern was pulled underwater, completely swamping the boat. Craig, I believe, was thrown overboard at this time. The roof of the cabin came down and struck me in the head as the stern was pulled under, and Bob, who was behind me in the cabin, was hit in the face by a plastic toolbox. During this melee, Bob was most assuredly more concerned with my safety than his as I remember him yelling for me to get out even though he had more distance and obstacles to overcome than I did. At some point after the initial onrush of water, the cable must have detached itself from the reel, which partially, but albeit temporarily righted the boat. That presented my avenue for escape; and I dove out across the extended boom to relative safety. Upon surfacing, I saw Craig in the water nearby and the bow of the boat pointing skyward, some distance upstream from us. Bob, however, was nowhere to be seen. The boat turned slightly as we swam toward her, and I saw Bob, through the cabin window still trapped inside. He then disappeared from view, and as the boat continued to turn, Bob emerged from the forward cabin door and was revealed to us, clutching the rails of the bow. Quickly, it was determined that the boat was mortally wounded and would provide no stable floatation. So we set off, swimming toward distant Missouri, trying to stay together. The strong current forced Bob further and further south of us as we doggedly swam toward land. A surface riffle, which ran back toward the center of the river, pushed Craig and I further away from one another as well. Soon, both Craig and Bob had slipped from my sight around a bend in the river. Later, after a final, hard twenty-foot sprint, I made landfall on a rotting stump on the bank, approximately 45 minutes after we went into the water. I proceeded downstream roughly 1/4 mile looking for Craig and Bob. At that point, fearing that they might have been pulled into the main channel, I reversed course and began to go upstream in search of help. I was in the process of trying to flag down a passing barge when I heard voices in the woods to my right, which turned out to be my lost comrades. After rejoining them, we began an arduous journey back to our vehicles. This included walking several miles in tangled underbrush, around endless cornfields and pasture, up and down several ravines (complete with barbed-wire fences), and swimming two backwater creeks. Completing this task was exhausting and yet we weren't through. The only way back to our vehicles was a two-thousand-foot railroad trestle, which we negotiated with a minimum of looking down. We arrived at our vehicles shortly after 1800. In summary, with regard to the events on the afternoon of July 8, 1998, I can state only the following: In my opinion, all safety measures were followed prior and up to the time of the accident. Every effort made immediately following the initial snagging until the moment the boat went down was correct and forthright. In past instances of sampling, the exact procedures employed on July 8, 1998, remedied the situation quickly and effectively. This time, events and river conditions conspired together to spell disaster. Three important components saved our lives after we went into the water that day. First: Our PFD's. I would have perished within ten minutes due to extreme fatigue and certainly would not have been able to swim 45 minutes to shore without it. They are indispensable and vital to survival. Two: Level Heads. I never sensed any panic or fear in either of my coworkers at anytime during or after the accident. They responded, in every instance, with calm diligence and determination, which allayed any misgivings, I might have had due to our circumstances. I can only attribute that to courage, experience, training, and old-fashioned guts. Without level heads, no one would have survived that day. Third: God. God was watching over all three of us that day. Craig's Account We had rated the bag sampler at Bridge Station 2115. Bob was piloting the boat, Brett was running the boom and I was "clean hands." The river stage was 32.5-33.0 feet and 2/10 depth velocities measured 6.5 feet per second. At approximately 1410, Bob was holding the boat as stationary as possible. Brett lowered the sampler to the bottom where it immediately hung on an unknown stationary object. (This account is from the position of facing forward in the boat.) The right rear quarter of the boat was pulled down very quickly. Bob told Brett to release the cable brake and Brett did so immediately. Bob tried to throttle up and point the boat upstream to put some slack in the cable. The boat did not respond because the right quarter was down. The boat listed hard to the right. The nose of the boat was pushed left. The list of the boat caused the lower unit and propeller to be partially pulled up out of the water. Therefore, the motor could not provide enough thrust to allow Bob to make any corrections. At this point, Bob directed us to cut the cable. I attempted to do so, but the moving cable could not be cut with hand-held cutters. My last attempt to cut the cable landed me in the water. The cable was extremely tight but would not roll off the reel as fast as we were being pushed downstream by the current. At some point, I suspect when all the cable had unrolled, but was still attached to the reel, the boat sank by the stern at an unbelievable speed. Brett jumped clear and as the boat's bow went vertical, Bob was trapped in the forward cabin. I estimate that from the time the sampler got hung up to the time the boat was lost was about 6 to 10 seconds. After seeing that Brett was in the water and was conscious, we began looking and calling for Bob. It was immediately apparent that he was still in the boat. At this point, only about three feet of the bow of the boat was sticking straight up out of the water. Bob was submerged in the cabin! I attempted to swim to the boat to help Bob from my downstream position. However, with the velocity of the water and the drag of my wet clothes, I could make little or no progress toward the boat. Shortly, the bow of the boat pivoted and I could see Bob clinging to the bow rail. At this time, the boat began to drift downstream and we were close enough to talk. We headed for the Right Bank by swimming on our backs and drifting downstream. Brett and I found ourselves nearing the bank, 30 or so yards. I looked around for Bob and saw that the current had separated him from us, some 150 to 200 yards. I was watching Bob when Brett made it to the bank. I did not want to lose sight of Bob. The vegetation and obstructions on the bank would not have allowed me to move downstream on the bank quickly enough to keep him in sight. So I decided to stay in the water in order to keep Bob in sight. One-half to one mile downstream from Brett, Bob went out of my sight around a point on the bank. I realized that I was getting dangerously tired and swam to the bank and got out. I immediately headed downstream to find Bob. Bob and I met on the bank some 200 yards downstream from where I got out. We headed back up to find Brett. Finding Brett, we all headed for the railroad bridge which was the only way to cross the river some 2 1/2 to 3 miles upstream. We had to swim two or three backwater creeks where the water looked and smelled particularly bad. We finally reached the railroad bridge, crossed and returned to our trucks. In my opinion, once the sampler got hung up, nothing anyone could have done with the equipment available to us, could have prevented this accident. Everyone on board acted quickly and correctly. There was no visible drift on the river, no waves, no wind, no warning. The only thing that saved our lives was God Almighty and our PFD's. I have some recommendations: 1. Never operate anything, which hangs down into the water from over the side of the boat. Samplers, measuring equipment, etc. must be mounted and operated from the bow. 2. PFD's must be worn. No one in our situation would have had time to put one on. Had we not been wearing them, we would be dead. 3. Boats must have positive floatation, communications gear designated to each boat, and the boat and equipment must be of a size and type appropriate to the water in which they are to be used. 4. Boats where seasonable cold water exists must have a life raft or boat of substantial size to safely hold the crew. We were in the water approximately 40 minutes to 1 hour. Had this accident happened in the winter, we would be dead. 5. A moving cable is impossible to cut with hand-held cutters. A permanently mounted cable cutter must be installed on the boom, and it must be capable of cutting a moving cable in two seconds or less. Breakaway reels are not practical, because there would likely be little room to get away from the rig as the reel breaks away--and absolutely no time to do the same. July 14, 1998 Memorandum via Email To: Steve Eck, Acting Bureau Safety Officer, Reston, VA From: Thomas K. Edwards, Bureau Watercraft Safety Program Mgr, Portland, OR Subject: Bureau Watercraft Safety Program assessment of July 8, 1998 boating accident at station 07022000, Mississippi River at Thebes, IL At about 2:10 P.M. July 8, 1998 three members (Bob Whitaker, Craig French, and Brett Giddens) of the WRD, Missouri District office in Rolla, MO were involved in a boating accident on the Mississippi River. All three survived, but the boat (17-foot Monark) sank in about 50 feet of water and is considered a total loss. This accident assessment is based on the information provided by Richard Huizinga, District Safety Officer, Rolla, MO. It is hoped that by careful analysis of the factors contributing to this accident and the survival of the three person crew all of us throughout the U.S. Geological Survey will benefit. It is not my intention to find fault or place blame here. THE ACCIDENT: In my view the major factors contributing to this accident and its severity are: (1) location of reel/boom sampling equipment; (2) the poor trim of the boat as a result of poor weight distribution; (3) flow velocity; (4) length of sounding cable versus depth; (5) inability to cutthe sounding cable; (6) lack of maneuverability once the sampling equipment was fouled; and (7) unsecured onboard equipment. Location of reel/boom sampling equipment ________________________________________ There are four possible onboard locations for equipment used to suspend sampling or measuring equipment overboard. This equipment can be mounted to suspend equipment over the bow, over the side, through a well, or over the stern. The least favorable location is over the stern, and over the side at or near the stern is just as bad. With overboard equipment at or near the stern several inherently bad things can happen. The sounding line could become fouled in the engine(s). The drag created by the equipment retards steering response. Fouled equipment at this point will result in pulling the boat into a stern-to-the-current orientation with little or no possibility of recovery. Among these, the only thing that didn't happen here was fouling the sounding cable in the engine(s). Poor trim of the boat as a result of poor weight distribution _____________________________________________________________ Placing the sampling equipment on the same side of the boat as the boat operator ensures that a concentration of weight will be there anytime samples are collected or measurements are made. This is particularly critical on a small boat. In this case, the concentration of weight resulted in the boat listing to starboard during normal operation. At the least this reduced the freeboard (distance between the water- line and the top of the hull at the gunwale), and contributed to sluggish maneuverability and lack of positive control. Flow velocity _____________ Based on the information provided by crew members during the post accident interviews, the flow velocity at the time of the accident was near 5 fps (feet per second). There is little doubt that the flow velocity is a major factor here. If the submerged object had been fouled in calm water the boat could have been stopped and easily held in place while the equipment was cleared or cut free. In this case, the force of the moving water immediately took over when the engine power was reduced and the boat began to swing downstream exposing the anchored stern to the current. Length of sounding cable versus depth ______________________________________ The boat is estimated to have sunk in approximately 50 feet of water. If that is the case the length of sounding cable likely exceeded this depth. Through some deductive reasoning plus years of personal experience working from boats in big rivers it is estimated that the wet-line length of the sounding cable may have significantly exceeded the depth when the sampler contacted the submerged object and became fouled. The combined velocity encountered by the sampler and sounding cable would have exceeded 10 fps with the boat moving upstream opposing a 5 fps current. This would result in a large wetline correction necessary for the sampler to reach the bottom during a traverse through the sample vertical. If the bottom topography changed abruptly or large debris was encountered the sampler could easily become fouled. To protect the safety of boat and crew a boom operator and boat operator must work as a team. There should be cross communication to ensure that the boom operator always knows the depth of flow at the sampled vertical. At the same time the boat operator should be aware of the amount of cableout. Because a boat must always be free to safely maneuver it is not a good practice to sound with cable suspended equipment unless the boat is stationary at anchor or attached to a tagline. If the boat is underway depths should be determined using an acoustical depth sounder unit so the boom operator knows the depth prior to releasing the cable. Inability to cut the sounding cable ___________________________________ Because it was necessary to release the sounding cable from the reel and allow the boat to float downstream with the force of the current the cable was never stationary relative to the boat. This made it impossible to grip the cable with the cutting device and sever the line. Also, if the cutting device was a pair of side cutters it would have been difficult at best to sever the line even with a stationary cable. Another problem is where to cut the cable. The best location for use of the cutting tool is near the reel spool behind the idler sheave. This allows the cut to be made in a confined space and gives the best chance to complete the cut with the cable in motion. Also, the energy stored in the cable under tension can be released without leaving a long segment of cable outboard of the boom that could whip back at the boom operator. Another advantage is keeping the boom operator's weight inboard during the cutting procedure and eliminating the potential for being pulled overboard. A better alternative cutting device is a pair of cable shears. A variety of tools designed to cut light cable are available on the market. Many of these tools can be used to easily sever light cable with one hand. Also, because these tools cut quickly and cleanly there is a possibility that the cable could be cut even while moving. In practice, however, this is probably much more difficult than it seems. Some consideration should be given to designing a cable cutter that can be permanently affixed to standard A, B, or E reels. This device must be capable of cutting the cable quickly and cleanly with one smooth single- handed motion. Retrofitting onboard reels with the new breakaway kits available from the Hydrologic Instrumentation Facility is another fail- safe that could have allowed the boat and crew to escape even if the cable could not be cut. Lack of maneuverability once the sampling equipment was fouled ______________________________________________________________ Except for some specialty designs, boats are steered by directing the thrust of the propulsion system. Because the propulsion is at the stern of the boat the stern will always move first in response to a change at the helm. Therefore, if equipment at the stern is fouled on some stationary object or even a large floating object the steering system is immediately rendered useless no matter how much power is applied. At this point the boat operator has no possibility of maneuvering clear to save the boat and crew. In moving water boat position and bow angle of attack relative to the flow is the difference between being in control and being at the mercy of the river. Clearly this was the case here. Unsecured onboard equipment ___________________________ The fact that the boat operator was hit by a shifting tool box during the capsize illustrates that at least some heavy equipment was not secured in place. This could easily have been the difference between survival and disaster if he had been rendered unconscious. All items placed onboard any boat should be considered movable ballast and as such must be firmly secured in place. If heavy unsecured items shift unexpectedly while underway they may cause injury or could severely effect the boats trim. SURVIVAL: The primary factors contributing to the survival of the three crew members are: (1) personal flotation devices; (2) certification as boat operators; (3) relatively warm water temperature; and (4) luck. Personal flotation devices __________________________ First and foremost the fact that all crew members were wearing personal flotation devices saved their lives. Not only were they able to float free of the sinking vessel, they were able to stay afloat as the current carried them downstream while they attempted to swim to shore. Without personal flotation it is unlikely that all would have survived the ordeal. Certification as boat operators _______________________________ Both the boat operator (Bob Whitacker) and boom operator (Craig French) were certified boat operators under the Department of the Interior's training policy. Both received operator certification training in May 1997. There is little doubt that this training contributed in some measure to the crew's survival. Relatively warm water temperature _________________________________ Even though the actual water temperature at the time of the accident is unknown, typical summertime water temperatures associated with seasonably warmer air temperatures helped improve survivability. The crew estimated they were in the water 45 plus minutes, and floated about 2 miles down- stream. If this accident had occurred during the winter months hypothermia would have certainly played a major role and could have claimed some or all of these crew members. The 50/50 rule states that an unprotected person in water less than or equal to 50 degrees Fahrenheit has a 50 percent chance of surviving for 50 minutes. In this case they would have been pushing their limits in colder water. Luck ____ In any situation like this luck can play a major part in survival or disaster. This is no exception. There was no small measure of luck here particularly in the case of Bob Whitaker who had to escape the confines of the submerged pilothouse as the boat sank.